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THE OFFENSE OF REASON 
AND THE PASSION OF FAITH: 
KIERKEGAARD AND ANTI-RATIONALISM 
Karen L. Carr 
This essay considers and reject~ both the irrationalist and the supra-ratio-
nalist interpretations of Kierkegaard, arguing that a new category-
Kierkegaard as "anti-rationalist" -is needed. The irrationalist reading 
overemphasizes the subjectivism of Kierkegaard's thought, while the supra-
rationalist reading underemphasizes the degree of tension between human 
reason (as corrupted by the will's desire to be autonomous and self-sustain-
ing) and Christian faith. An anti-rationalist reading, I argue, is both faith-
ful to Kierkegaard's metaphysical and alethiological realism, on the one 
hand, and his emphasis on the continuing opposition between reason and 
faith, on the other, as manifested in the ongoing possibility of offense (rea-
son's rejection of the Christian message) in the life of the Christian. 
I 
Despite the number of works written on the subject, Kierkegaard's 
stance on the relationship between reason and faith remains an ongoing 
topic of debate. Some scholars argue that he is an irrationalist because 
he emphasizes that faith is passionate conviction to something which is 
not only objectively uncertain, but objectively absurd. Others argue that 
he is better thought of as a supra-rationalist, someone who distinguishes 
between, but does not finally oppose, reason and faith. Still others argue 
that Kierkegaard is a rationalist (albeit a somewhat peculiar one) who 
believes that there are good reasons for a Christian to prefer Christianity 
to all other religious paths. 
While one can find evidence for each of these interpretations within 
Kierkegaard's writings, I believe that all three ultimately mischaracter-
ize his understanding of religious faith. In different ways, both the 
supra-rationalist and the rationalist readings of Kierkegaard fail to rec-
ognize the depth of the antagonism between reason and genuine reli-
gious commitment and consequently ignore the persistent tension 
between reason and faith (a tension that continues even after the life of 
faith has been embraced). Despite this tension, however, I will argue 
that Kierkegaard does not regard reason as intrinsically hostile to reli-
gious truth, nor does he regard any passionately held belief to be true, 
as the irrationalist reading would have it. 
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On my reading, Kierkegaard is best described as an anti-rationalist. 
By "anti-rationalist" I mean, following A.C. Graham, someone who 
denies "that reason is the right means to see things as they are/' while 
also denying that this "allows you to see things as you like:'" An anti-
rationalist, in other words, rejects the use of reason in the pursuit of reli-
gious truth but does not, in the same stroke, render truth simply a mat-
ter of subjective conviction, a product of the arbitrary will of the individ-
ual. Kierkegaard, I will argue, regards human reason not as irrelevant 
or indifferent to religious truth but as actively hostile to it in the life of 
an existing individual. This hostility, however, is not due to any logical-
ly necessary contradiction between reason and religious truth, but to the 
insidious influence of the sinning will of the individual, a will which 
seeks to be master of itself and thus disobedient to Cod. Faith, for 
Kierkegaard, is a fundamental reorientation of the self away from an 
always illusory autonomy toward genuine obedience and submission to 
the creator; this obedience is most clearly manifested in the individual's 
ongoing refusal to respond with offense to a message that reason 
describes as absurd. Because reason can only lead one away from reli-
gious truth both before and after the commitment to Christianity has 
been made, Kierkegaard is neither a rationalist nor a supra-rationalist; at 
the same time, because the truth of Christianity (and, by extension, of 
faith) is in no way dependent on the subjective intensity of the believer 
(or on the paradoxical nature of its message), he is not an irrationalist. A 
new category-anti-rationalist-is needed. 
11 
Perhaps the most common element of the Kierkegaard-as-irrationalist 
interpretation is the claim that, for Kierkegaard, the sole determining 
factor in assessing the beliefs of an individual is the degree of passion 
with which the belief is held-the amount of evidence for or against any 
given belief is irrelevant. The passion factor measures, so this reading 
goes, not only the integrity of the believer but also the truth of his or her 
belief. In this vein, for example, Alastair MacIntyre writes that, for 
Kierkegaard, "the criterion of both choice and truth is intensity of feel-
ing."2 The passage from his work most often cited to support this comes 
from Concllldillg Unscientific Postscript. In that work, Kierkegaard, writ-
ing as Johannes Climacus, asks 
If someone who lives in the midst of Christianity enters, with 
knowledge of the true idea of Cod, the house of Cod, the house 
of the true God, and prays, but prays in untruth [i.e., insincere-
ly L and if someone lives in an idolatrous land, but prays with all 
the passion of infinity, although his eyes are resting upon the 
image of an idol-where, then, is there more truth? The one 
prays in truth to God although he is worshipping an idol; the 
other prays in untruth to the true God and is therefore in truth 
worshipping an idoP 
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Viewed in isolation from both the Postscript as a whole and 
Kierkegaard's other works, this passage seems to suggest that as long as 
one believes sincerely-i.e., is committed one hundred percent to the 
object of one's belief, with the "passion of infinity" -one believes truly. 
Thus there is no difference between the so-called "fanatic" and the "true 
believer;" anyone who believes sincerely, believes truly. 
This claim is usually combined with a second, that for Kierkegaard 
passion and reason are mutually exclusive, that the more "reasons" one 
has for believing something, the less passionate and emotional will be 
the resulting belief. Here, too, Concluding Unscientific Postscript is usual-
ly cited as the best source for this view. Kierkegaard's pseudonym, 
Johannes Climacus, argues that uncertainty is a necessary prerequisite 
for passionate belief, distinguishing quite sharply between reasonable 
knowledge and belief: 
The almost probable, the probable, the to-a-high-degree and 
exceedingly probable-that he can almost know, or as good as 
know, to a higher degree and exceedingly almost know-but 
believe it, that cannot be done, for the absurd is precisely the 
object of faith and only that can be believed (CUP, 211). 
Thus, on this reading, belief is linked with passion, and passion 
requires the absence of reasons or justification for the belief; hence in 
order to believe passionately, there must not be adequate grounds for 
holding that belief-one's belief must not be "probably true." 
From this it is a short step to the third component of the irrationalist 
reading: that the degree of passion in belief is negatively correlated with 
its reasonableness. That is, the more reasonable a belief is, the less pas-
sionately it is held (and the less it can be said to be believed, strictly 
speaking), while the more unreasonable a belief is, the greater the pas-
sion binding it to the believer. Here interpreters can point to the many 
references made by Kierkegaard, through the voice of Climacus and 
other pseudonyms, to the "absurd" and the "absolute paradox" as the 
true object of belief. According to the logic of this argument, then, the 
most passionate, and by extension the (at least subjectively) truest belief 
will be the least reasonable, bordering on, even passing over into, out-
right contradiction. The combined force of these three claims (first, that 
passion is the criterion of truth and belief; second, that reason is inimical 
to the intensity of passion; therefore, third, the best object for passion is 
absurd, a paradox) renders Kierkegaard a fairly strong irrationalist: rea-
son cannot help you-indeed, it can only hurt you-in your search for 
truth, because truth is a function of the passion of the believer. By impli-
cation, whatever you intensely believe to be true, is true (at least for you) 
and the only things you can really believe (as opposed to "merely" know) 
to be true are irrational.4 
Although this reading does have some textual support, it has at least 
two serious shortcomings. First, this reading cannot account for the fact 
that Kierkegaard unquestionably believes that one path (the Christian-
religious path) is superior to all others and is indeed the only true path, 
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not only for him but for others as well. Whatever praise the Climacus 
pseudonym might heap on the passion of the pagan, in the end for 
Kierkegaard only one objective absurdity, the Incarnation, corresponds 
to the truth. Despite the passage from the Postscript quoted above about 
the pagan, Kierkegaard-and for that matter, Climacus also-clearly 
distinguishes genuine passion from "aberrant" forms; the distinction 
does not rest upon the sincerity of the passion, but on the nature of its 
object. Don Quixote is cited several times within the Postscript as an 
example of "subjective lunacy. liS The irrationalist reading of 
Kierkegaard/Climacus cannot account for such a distinction other than 
to regard it as an unfortunate inconsistency in his position. Were 
Kierkegaard an irrationalist, he would be unable to distinguish between 
objects of faith-or, at the very least, between irrational objects of faith: 
any irrational belief would be equally good as any other. But for 
Kierkegaard, the truth of Christianity is not grounded in its being irra-
tional, but only in its objective, empirical reality-only if God in fact 
became a man at a certain point in history is Christianity true, the sub-
jective intensity of millions of believers notwithstanding. The funda-
mental, underlying realism of Kierkegaard's thought is made quite clear 
in the non-pseudonymous On Authority and Revelation: 
Christianity exists before any Christian exists, it must exist in 
order that one may become a Christian, it contains the determi-
nant by which one may test whether one has become a 
Christian, it maintains its objective subsistence apart from all 
believers ... [E]ven if no one had perceived that God had revealed 
himself in a human form in Christ, he nevertheless has revealed 
himself." 
The second difficulty with the irrationalist reading is that it cannot 
account for the fact that Kierkegaard himself uses reason, in at least two 
ways. He uses it, first, to describe faith phenomenologically, i.e., with-
out respect to the truth of its object. Kierkegaard cannot both reject rea-
son as intrinsically hostile to religious truth and use it as a vehicle for 
characterizing faith without contradiction. If nothing else, the internal 
coherence of Kierkegaard's position and the tightness of many of his 
arguments demonstrate a healthy respect for reason, properly 
employed. He uses reason, second, to show why reason cannot be a pri-
mary means of attaining faith, that its function is purely negative in the 
acquisition and realization of faith, if certain assumptions about the 
nature of human beings and, in particular, about their relationship to the 
creator and to themselves are accepted as true. Kierkegaard's author-
ship can, in part, be understood as an attempt to offer a compelling and 
consistent model of religious faith in which reason, by definition, can 
play only a negative role. Thus, Kierkegaard uses reason on the meta-
level, to describe what faith is and how it is realized; but part of that 
description, as we shall see below, involves a severe restriction and a 
redefinition of reason's role vis-a-vis faith. 
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III 
Dissatisfaction with the irrationalist interpretation has led a number 
of scholars to offer a supra-rationalist reading of Kierkegaard. Many 
proponents of this interpretation argue that the irrationalist reading 
relies too heavily on one pseudonymous author, Johannes Climacus, and 
identifies his words with those of Kierkegaard. Not only does such a 
move ignore Kierkegaard's explicit disclaimer that in the Postscript 
"there is not a single word by me,"7 but it overlooks the fact that 
Johannes Climacus is a professed non-Christian, and thus views 
Christianity from the outside. Alastair McKinnon, for example, has 
argued at length that it is essential to treat the works written under the 
non-Christian pseudonyms quite differently from the Christian, and that 
when one does so one sees that the phrases so beloved of the 
Kierkegaard-as-irrationalist camp ("faith by virtue of the absurd," "the 
absolute paradox") essentially disappear in the Christian and non-pseu-
donymous works. On this reading, something fundamental happens to 
the Christian after he or she has embraced the cross and what appears 
absurd to the unbeliever does not so appear to the believer: "The object 
of faith is the absurd or paradox but only for one who sees it from the 
outside, for one who does not yet have faith. For the man of faith it is no 
longer absurd or paradoxical."" Timothy Jackson makes essentially the 
same point when he writes " .. .faith does not violate the intellect but 
rather sets it aside or supersedes it. ... Kierkegaardian faith embraces in 
passionate inwardness what reason alone is unable to demonstrate is not 
a genuine antimony. Reason is not contradicted, but neither is it given 
the last word."9 
Further support for some version of the supra-rationalist reading can 
be found within the Climacus pseudonym itself, in the discussion in 
Philosophical Fragments of the relationship between the believer and the 
savior. C. Stephen Evans's recent book, Passionate Reason, offers a com-
pelling account of Climacus's view of reason and its role in the process 
of faith formation. Through a dose analysis of Climacus's argument as 
it unfolds in the Fragments, Evans argues that the problem is not with 
reason per se but with its "imperialistic character" whereby it seeks to 
function as "an instrument of control or even domination."tO This impe-
rialistic reasoning confronts the paradox of the incarnation (understood 
by Evans not as a formal logical contradiction but as something resistant 
to human understanding, which appears to be a contradictionll ) and ini-
tially stands mute before it. On Evans's reading, reason cannot even 
understand that the paradox is a paradox without being transformed-
hence the distinction between a teacher (who merely helps the individ-
ual become aware of something he already knows) and the savior (who 
actively transforms the individual, providing him with the "condition" 
whereby he can grasp the truth). Once transformed, the individual is 
confronted with a choice: either to accept that reason has its limits, and 
accept the paradox in faith, or to be offended, and to dismiss it as absurd 
or contradictory. 
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For our purposes, what is crucial about Evans' reading is his empha-
sis that reason can and does playa positive role in this process, albeit of 
a limited nature. This positive role has two facets. First, Evans notes 
that "Although Climacus argues that the incarnation is something which 
cannot be rationally understood, he regards this claim as itself one 
which is subject to rational scrutiny. One cannot rationally understand 
the paradox, but one can hope rationally to understand why the paradox 
cannot be understood" (l08). As a product of this recognition, second, 
reason can freely choose to "'set itself aside.'" From this Evans con-
cludes that "Climacus does not think that the tension between human 
reason and the paradox is a necessary tension ... Faith is described as a 
happy passion in which reason and the paradox are on good terms .. .In 
other words, there is no conflict between faith and reason if reason can 
accept the limitations of reason" (l08). 
Evans has made a strong case that in the Fragments, at least, a supra-
rationalist model of faith is developed. 12 I do not believe, however, that 
one can move from this to the broader claim that Kierkegaard himself is 
a supra-rationalist-a claim, to be sure, that Evans does not make in this 
book-nor am I persuaded that even Climacus, in the end, embraces a 
supra-rationalist view of faith. In order to understand Kierkegaard's 
position, one must supplement the treatment of reason and offense 
given in the Fragments with that given by the pseudonym Anti-Climacus 
in Sickness Unto Death and Practice in Christianity, two works in which 
the concept of offense (reason's response to Christianity) is discussed at 
length. When one further adds into the mix Climacus' discussion in the 
Postscript of how Christianity is distinct from "paganism," even the 
claim that Climacus is a supra-rationalist becomes suspect. The conjunc-
tion of Sickness Unto Death, Practice in Christianity, and the Postscript 
results in a reading that sees reason operating in continuing opposition 
to faith even after the truth of Christianity has been embraced by the 
believer. 
IV 
The pseudonyms Anti-Climacus and Climacus clearly stand in a spe-
cial relationship with one another. The fact that Climacus is expressly a 
non-Christian, while Anti-Climacus "regards himself as a Christian on 
an extraordinarily high level,"13 coupled with a prefix usually suggest-
ing antagonism, might lead one to infer that they represent divergent, 
even opposing points of view on the nature of faith. According to 
Howard and Edna Hong, however, "the prefix' Anti-' ... does not mean 
'against.' It is an old form of 'ante' (before), as in 'anticipate,' and 
'before' also denotes a relation of rank, as in 'before me' in the First 
Commandment."'" This suggests that the works of Anti-Climacus and 
Climacus are complementary, possibly with a fuller and more complete 
picture of faith provided by Anti-Climacus. Kierkegaard himself explic-
itly stated that Climacus' Postscript and Anti-Climacus' Sickness Unto 
Death and Practice in Christianity convey most clearly his understanding 
of Christianity.'s 
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Of the two works attributed to Anti-Climacus, Sickness Unto Oeath is 
probably the more widely known. In it, the author develops first a psy-
chological model of the self as a dynamic entity which is continually in 
the process of making and remaking itself, and then recasts the psycho-
logical model into a theological framework. Two assumptions drive 
Anti-Climacus' discussion: first, that most people fail to be selves, either 
by never attempting to become a self at all, or by attempting to become 
the wrong kind of self. Second, that the human self is created by God 
("the Power that posits it") and thus always stands in a dependent rela-
tionship to him. As a result, even though I may be striving to be a self 
as I understand it to be, if I am not constantly relating myself to God in 
this process, I am attempting to be the wrong kind of self-to be a self 
that is self-sustaining, rather than dependent upon God. 
After developing a typology of despair at some length, Anti-Climacus 
turns to his primary theme: that despair, or the failure to be a self or to 
be the right kind of self, is sin. More precisely, sin is despair "before 
God." In connecting despair and sin he has provided a clarification of 
the classical Christian concept of sin as refusal to submit to God. In 
Anti-Climacus's terms, we disobey God by refusing (either through 
indolence, weakness, or defiance) to be the kind of self he created us to 
be, a self which is both free to define itself and bound by its relation to 
its creator. The introduction of God (as the "establisher" of every 
human being, who thereby exists in a dependent relationship with him) 
ensures that no individual is able to free him- or herself of despair 
through his or her own efforts. Any such attempt is an attempt to define 
oneself by oneself-i.e., any such attempt is an example of defiant 
despair. Although we are all responsible for our despair, ultimately it is 
only God who can free us of it. 
Anti-Climacus develops his picture of sin as "despair before God" by 
introducing the category of "offense." Faced with Christianity-in par-
ticular, with its account of a God who so loves human beings that he 
died on the cross to atone for their sin-the despairing individual is 
offended: he proclaims the message of Christianity insane or ridicu-
lous.16 He tells himself (and others) that Christianity makes no sense, 
that it is absurd. This is, for Anti-Climacus, a telling example of the defi-
ance of the despairing individual-essentially this person has set up his 
own intellect, his own reason, as the arbiter of what is possible and what 
is true; he has forgotten, to borrow a phrase used by both the Anti-
Climacus pseudonym and others, that with God "all things are possi-
ble." What Christianity demands, according to Anti-Climacus, is obedi-
ence and submission; any attempt to understand it, to comprehend it, is 
an attempt to gain mastery over it. "The secret of all comprehending is 
that this comprehending is itself higher than any position it posits." 
(SUD 97). Confronted with Christianity, the individual has, for Anti-
Climacus, only two choices: "either it must be believed or one must be 
scandalized and offended by it" (SUD, 98); " ... all Christianity turns on 
this, that it must be believed and not comprehended" (SUD 98). 
To clarify his account of despair as sin, and the distinctively Christian 
nature of sin, he contrasts his model with the Socratic, a strategy also 
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employed by Climacus in Philosophical Fragments. On the Socratic 
model, sin is simple ignorance: One chooses evil out of the mistaken 
notion that it is really good. On the Christian model, by contrast, one 
chooses evil knowing it is evil, indeed, because it is evil. Sin is thus not a 
negation or a privation (as in the Socratic model, an absence of knowl-
edge) but a position, an active force. There is a sense, Anti-Climacus 
suggests, in which Christian sin can be understood as ignorance, but it is 
a willed ignorance-and in that adjective lies a world of difference from 
the Socratic. To the extent that individual believes his evil choice to be 
the right one, it is because he has persuaded himself that this is the case. 
Anti-Climacus describes this process as the corruption of the mind by 
the will: 
In the life of the spirit there is no standing still...therefore, if a 
person does not do what is right at the very second he knows 
it-then, first of all, knowing simmers down. Next comes the 
question of how willing appraises what is known .. .If willing 
does not agree with what is known, then it does not necessarily 
follow that willing goes ahead and does the opposite of what 
knowing understood ... rather, willing allows some time to 
elapse, an interim called: 'We shall look at it tomorrow.' During 
all this time, knowing becomes more and more obscure, and the 
lower nature gains the upper hand more and more ... And when 
knowing has become duly obscured, knowing and willing can 
better understand each other; eventually they agree completely, 
for now knowing has come over to the side of willing and 
admits that what it wants is absolutely right (SUD, 94). 
Sin, then, is essentially a form of self-deception in which the individual 
willingly turns away from the good (a life "grounded transparently in 
the power that posits it") and persuades himself that the evil he prefers 
is really good. 
The parallel with self-deception is both important and instructive, for 
it helps to clarify why Anti-Climacus believes an individual to be inca-
pable of thinking his or her way out of despair into faith. A person in 
the throes of self-deception is unable to heal him- or herself precisely 
beca use self-deception is a corruption of the reasoning process. 
Generally, we label another self-deceived because he or she believes 
something to be the case despite extremely compelling evidence to the 
contrary. We deem this other to be self-deceived, rather than simply 
ignorant (the Socratic model) because the contrary evidence seems 
impossible to ignore; thus we say the individual "knows," in some 
sense, the falsity of what he or she believes, even while denying this to 
be the case. A self-deceived person doesn't ignore the contrary evi-
dence; he simply assesses it incorrectly (deeming it unimportant, for 
example), usually because of some great personal stake he has in what 
he believes being true. (Consider, for example, a woman who continues 
to assert that her husband "really" loves her despite his constant mental 
and physical abuse of her. She is not unaware of the abuse, but she may 
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construct an elaborate justification scheme in which the abuse becomes 
actual evidence of his love, rather than the obvious counter-indication it 
seems to others.) Because the reasoning process is impaired-and 
indeed, perpetuates its own impairment through its ongoing efforts at 
rationalization-the individual is simply not able to think his or her 
way to the truth so obvious to others. In tbe case of despair, the situa-
tion is, if anything, even worse because the self-deception occurs at such 
a fundamental level: the very definition of who and what the self is. 
One's reasoning powers have always already been coopted by the sin-
ning will; not only does reason fail to help us, it actively leads us astray 
through the pernicious influence of the will. 
What, though, of an individual who has been transformed through 
grace by his or her confrontation with the savior? Granted, prior to the 
acceptance of Christianity, its message is an offense to one's reasoning 
powers; but after one has responded with faith (after one's will has been 
retooled, in effect) does the same tension between reason and the 
Christian truth exist? 
I believe that it does, and this is why I think Kierkegaard is best 
thought of as an anti-rationalist, rather than as a supra-rationalist or a 
rationalist. While it is true that the believer is not offended by the para-
dox-that "when the believer has faith, the absurd is not the absurd," to 
quote the journal entry often cited by proponents of the supra-rationalist 
interpretation'7-this does not mean that the believer comprehends the 
paradox, or that the tension between reason and faith is lessened. To 
suggest that it is, I will argue below, unintentionally collapses 
Christianity (or what Climacus in the Postscript refers to as Religiousness 
B) back into paganism (referred to by Climacus as Religiousness A); 
faith becomes an inward possession of the believer and Christianity 
loses what to Kierkegaard was its ultimate distinction: the crucifixion of 
the understanding. 
v 
Anti-Climacus continues the discussion of offense initiated in Sickness 
Unto DeatJz in Practice in Christianity. Here offense is defined as "that 
which conflicts with all (human) reason." 1S Such a thing cannot, by defi-
nition, be proven or demonstrated true: "One can 'demonstrate' only 
that it conflicts with reason" (26). Does this then mean that the Christian 
knows nothing of Christ? In a word, yes: " ... one cannot know anything 
at all about Christ; he is the paradox, the object of faith, exists only for 
faith" (25). Any attempt to come to a rational understanding of this 
object destroys it. "Jesus Christ is the object of faith; one must either 
believe in him or be offended; for to 'know' simply means that it is not 
about him .... knowledge annihilates Jesus Christ" (33). The sharp 
dichotomy between knowledge and faith, in other words, developed by 
Johannes Climacus-who is a self-professed non-Christi an-is 
expressed in much stronger terms by the Christian author Anti-
Climacus. Perhaps even more important, the battle between offense and 
belief is not presented by Anti-Climacus as a single event after which 
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faith, having conquered, reigns victorious, without opposition. Rather, 
the battle is portrayed as a constant struggle in the life of the believing 
Christian: "faith conquers the world by conquering at every moment the 
enemy within one's own inner being, the possibility of offense" (p. 76, 
my emphasis). The continuing precariousness of faith-and its ongoing 
relationship with offense-is one of this work's most recurring themes. 
"Faith is carried in a fragile earthen vessel, in the possibility of offense" 
(76). 
This clear indication that reason and faith remain in opposite and 
hostile corners even after one has committed oneself, in fear and trem-
bling, to Christianity is reiterated by Kierkegaard in his journals. The 
same entry which acknowledges that the absurd "is not the absurd" to 
the believer also stresses that "the absurd and faith are inseparables," 
that "true faith breathes healthfully and blessedly in the absurd."19 The 
non-believer, in other words, dismisses Christianity as nonsense, as 
sheer folly or madness; the believer does not do so, and yet while he 
"expresses just the opposite of offense ... he always has the possibility of 
offense as a negative category."2I) 
The ongoing presence of the possibility of offense in the life of faith is 
closely connected to Kierkegaard's conviction that religious faith is, 
above all else, an act of obedience and submission to God. Offense 
before Christianity is essentially refusal to obey the higher authority of 
God; to be offended before Christianity is to place one's own standard of 
truth and "reasonableness" ahead of the divine reality. For Kierkegaard, 
"the matter is very simple: will you or will you not obey, will you sub-
mit in faith to his divine authority, or will you take offense-or will you 
perhaps not take sides-be careful, for that, too, is offense."" 
Still, the question remains whether after one has been reborn in faith 
-- transformed by the savior discussed in Philosophical Fragments-the 
tension between reason and faith remains. After all, couldn't one argue 
that the possibility of offense is not the same as being offended, (just as 
the possibility of divorce, always present in marriage, is not the same as 
being divorced) and that therefore some sort of happy marriage between 
reason and faith then exists? 
I think not, given the distinction that Kierkegaard always wished to 
maintain between Christianity and what he dubbed "paganism," 
between the Religion of Paradox (Religiousness B, in the words of the 
Postscript) and the Religion of Immanence (Religiousness A), between 
Christ the Savior and Socrates the Teacher.22 Religiousness A, or pagan-
ism, teaches that the truth we need lies within ourselves; we need only 
recognize it. In Religiousness A, as Climacus puts it, "subjectivity is 
truth" and God may directly apprehended. Religiousness A is the reli-
gion of immediacy, of a direct relationship to God, unbroken and uncor-
rupted. This, for Kierkegaard as well as Climacus, is essentially the 
Socratic model, a model to which Christianity is consistently juxtaposed. 
Religiousness B, in contrast, teaches that subjectivity is untruth, that 
one's relationship with the divine is broken, corrupted. Because of this, 
God cannot be directly apprehended and the individual is unable to see 
and grasp the truth of his or her own accord. Revelation-one of the 
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distinctive marks of Christianity-is needed as well as the transforming 
influence of grace. Now, imagine that an individual transformed by 
grace is able to perceive the truth of Christianity directly-i.e,. that there 
is no longer any tension between the believer's reason and his or her 
faith; what happens? Faith then becomes a possession, and there is no 
longer any meaningful distinction between Religiousness A and 
Religiousness B; if the man of faith is ever able to understand it on his 
own (even after being transformed by God) essentially Christianity 
becomes a religion of immanence. But this is precisely what 
Kierkegaard devoted himself to battling; this is precisely what he 
believed to be wrong with the religious views of his contemporaries: 
What is commonly called Christendom (these thousands and 
millions) has made Christianity into utter nonsense. 
But, in addition, established Christendom's orthodoxy has 
actually transformed Christianity to paganism. 
Christ is the paradox; everything Christian is marked accord-
ingly, or as the synthesis it is such that it is marked by the 
dialectical possibility of offense. Orthodoxy ... has now taken 
this away and set in it place everywhere: the wonderful-glori-
ous, the glorious, the incomparably glorious and deep etc.-in 
short direct categories. 
Thus Christ acquires direct recognizability, but direct recog-
nizability means Christ is not 'the sign'; with direct recognizabil-
ity Christianity is paganism.23 
Thus, even after embracing Christ, his paradoxical nature remains for 
the believer; the battle against what Evans calls "imperialistic reason" 
must be fought continually. Otherwise faith becomes a possession, God 
becomes directly apprehendable, and Christianity becomes indistinct 
from paganism.24 Kierkegaard's anti-rationalism, in other words, is a 
key component of his understanding of Christian faith. 
VI 
I have argued above that Kierkegaard's position on faith, offense, rea-
son, and sin requires an anti-rationalist interpretation, that for 
Kierkegaard reason is always useless in, indeed at tension with, the real-
ization and maintenance of faith. In this final section, I would like briefly 
to discuss three possible objections one could make to this interpretation. 
The first objection concerns what this reading implies about 
Kierkegaard's picture of the believer's state of mind. Doesn't an anti-
rationalist reading make the content of faith unintelligible to the believ-
er? Doesn't it, in effect, make faith blind? And isn't the advantage of 
the supra-rationalist reading precisely that it preserves the tension 
between faith and reason prior to the believer's acceptance of 
Christianity without putting the believer in the position of affirming he 
knows not what? 
I accept that the picture of faith that ensues from a supra-rationalist 
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reading of Kierkegaard is, for many, more attractive than the picture of 
faith I have outlined above, but I don't believe that that is any ground 
for rejecting an anti-rationalist reading. Indeed, one could argue the 
reverse, that the attractiveness of the supra-rationalist model actually 
makes it suspect, given Kierkegaard's constant indictment of those who 
wished to make Christianity more appealing. For Kierkegaard, being a 
Christian is both fundamentally strenuous and always ultimately soli-
tary precisely because of the ongoing possibility of reason's offense to its 
message. The obedience demanded of the Christian was, in his eyes, 
manifested (not solely but importantly) in the believer's willingness to 
abandon the effort to make it comprehensible: " . .. what is it to believe? 
It is to will (what one ought and because one ought), God-fearingly and 
unconditionally obediently, to defend oneself against the vain thought 
of wanting to comprehend and against the vain imagination of being 
able to comprehend."25 In fact, Kierkegaard suggests that one's willing-
ness not to comprehend, to become like the lover who is blinded by love, 
is the mark of genuine faith: 
.. .Take an analogy. Love makes one blind. Yes, but it is never-
theless a cursed thing to become blind-well, then, you can just 
diminish the blindness a little so that one does not become 
entirely blind. But take care-for when you diminish the blind-
ness, you also diminish the love, because true love makes one 
entirely blind. 
And true faith breathes healthfully and blessedly in the 
absurd. The weaker faith must peer and speculate, just like the 
weaker love, which does not have the courage to become entire-
ly blind, and for that reason remains a weaker love, or, because 
it is a weaker love, it does not become entirely blind.26 
On my reading, Kierkegaard acknowledges the incomprehensibility of 
Christianity for the believer; but rather than regarding this as a defect, 
he sees it as symptom of faith's intensity and depth.27 
The second objection stems from the absence, in this essay, of any dis-
cussion of the historical context in which Kierkegaard's view of faith 
was generated. Kierkegaard's work clearly involved a polemic against 
Hegelian idealism, and thus one could argue (as have Louis Dupre and 
others) that J:lis "theory of faith must be understood as a reaction against 
Hegel."2~ This in turn might suggest that Kierkegaard's critique of rea-
son must be understood not as a generally anti-rationalist stance, but 
rather as a specific indictment of a particular conception of reason. 
Other, less absolutist, uses of reason might well escape Kierkegaard's 
disapprobation. 
I recognize, of course, that Kierkegaard's position on reason and its 
relationship to religious faith was distinctively and negatively shaped by 
the speculative idealism of his day; a longer essay would naturally dis-
cuss this influence in some detail. Simply because his views originated 
in that context, however, does not mean that their application should be 
limited to Hegelian thought (and its analogues), or that it was so limited 
248 Faith and Philosophy 
by Kierkegaard. For Kierkegaard, the problem with reason is its cor-
ruption by a sinning will, a will that seeks to be autonomous and that 
uses reason in its efforts to accomplish that end. Given both the perva-
siveness of sin and its self-deceptive powers, any use of reason in con-
junction with one's own religious faith (including those that might 
appear quite humble and harmless) must be regarded as a temptation to 
usurp the authority of God as the power upon whom humans depend 
for their existence, a temptation against which the believer must con-
stantly struggle. Kierkegaard undoubtedly regarded Hegelianism as a 
prime example of the corruption of reason by the will; but he did not 
regard it either as the first or as the last. 
This leads naturally into the third objection: How do I reconcile an 
anti-rationalist reading of Kierkegaard with my earlier claim that he does 
not view reason as intrinsically hostile to religious truth, with the fact 
that Kierkegaard himself employs reason, albeit in an indirect and often 
idiosyncratic fashion, to convey his position? If the content of faith 
remains incomprehensible to the believer, if indeed reason invariably 
leads one away from religious truth (both before and after it has been 
embraced by the individual), doesn't this imply that Kierkegaard would 
reject the use of reason in every realm? In other words, isn't "anti-ratio-
nalist" simply a nicer and less honest way of saying "misologist"? 
To answer these questions, it is essential to remember that, on my 
reading, Kierkegaard does not regard reason per se as the culprit pre-
venting us from having faith, although we might try to persuade our-
selves that it is; rather, the guilty party is always our disobedient will 
which uses reason in its attempt to justify itself. I have argued that sin 
for Kierkegaard is at root a dysfunction or breakdown in the process of 
individual self-definition; when I sin I attempt to establish myself as an 
independent being, a project always doomed to failure if I am in fact a 
derived, created being. For Kierkegaard, one of the primary ways I seek 
to define myself autonomously is through the use of my reason; rather 
than submitting in obedience to God's message, I use my reason to 
assess and pass judgment on it. In doing so, either I turn Christianity 
into something else (something subject to my will) or I deem it nonsensi-
cal and impossible. In both cases, I am seeking to make my own mind 
the final arbiter of truth; in both cases, I am in despair because the will 
driving my reason forward is attempting to be self-grounding. 
Does this mean then that on my reading Kierkegaard regards any and 
every use of reason as suspect? Yes and no. The answer is yes, in the 
area of self definition, in the realm of what Climacus refers to as "essen-
tial truth, or the truth that is essentially related to [my individual] exis-
tence" (CUP, 199fn). Here I must always resist the temptation of my will 
to use reason to establish for myself that which only God can establish 
for me-my own being. This remains as true for the Christian as for the 
unbeliever, and so the believer must be willing to become as though he 
were blind in faith. But no, reason is not suspect if we are not talking 
about self-definition or the realm of essential truth. I may be in the most 
severe state of despair and yet still use my reason with good effect to 
prove, for example, the irrationality of the squ;;'C' root of two. More rel-
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evantly, I might still be in despair and understand disinterestedly that if 
it is true that the Incarnation happened, if it is true that my salvation lies 
in believing that fact, if it is true that my will is corrupted by sin and 
uses reason to justify turning away from the truth, then it follows (quite 
rationally) that reason can be of no use to me in assessing any of these 
claims. I could write books describing what faith would look like, given 
these assumptions. I could paint the most glorious and internally con-
sistent picture of the religious life founded on these assumptions. But I 
will never be able to use my reason to establish the truth of these hypo-
the ticals; indeed, any attempt to do so will only drive me farther away 
from them. 
Kierkegaard's anti-rationalism, in other words, is distinct from misol-
ogism in that his rejection of reason is in no way entire; it is limited to 
the individual's private and personal pursuit of religious truth. As he 
himself demonstrates, it is possible to offer an internally consistent and 
coherent description of Christian faith, albeit one in which the role of 
reason is quite negatively portrayed. But from the fact that such third-
person descriptions are possible it cannot be inferred that reason is in 
any way a positive influence in the first-person transformation from 
unbeliever to believer, or in the ongoing maintenance of faith in the life 
of the individual. The possibility of offense, like the pull of gravity, 
remains constant; this in turn implies that the cooption of reason by a 
disobedient will is also always a possibility and that therefore the strug-
gle against such cooption never ceases. As Climacus puts is, 
Christianity does not "want to be the paradox for the believer, and then 
surreptitiously, little by little, provide him with understanding, because 
the martyrdom of faith (to crucify one's understanding) is not a martyr-
dom of the moment, but the martyrdom of continuance (CUP, 559).29 
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